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Jurisdictional Statement 
According to Article III, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, "Except for matters 
filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from 
the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads, "An appeal may be taken from a 
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all 
final orders and judgments." Additionally, Utah Code section 77-18a-1(1) explains, "A 
defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: (a) a final judgment of conviction, 
whether by verdict or plea." The Appellant plead guilty to two third degree felonies and 
was sentenced in 2007. Defendant filed a Motion to Modify Judgment on July 16, 2010. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case because the Findings and 
Order being appealed was the final order issued on his Motion by the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah, which is a district court within its jurisdiction. 
Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
The first main issue is whether the trial court erred when it incorrectly selected, 
interpreted, and/or applied the law regarding claims and assertions made by counsel in 
legal memoranda of what his client's testimony would be and then treating them as 
evidence, instead of hearsay that would necessitate an evidentiary hearing, and yet stating 
that the "arguments should have been raised either in a timely appeal of the Judgment, or 
in a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify 
Judgment (R.151); see also court findings in Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
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Modify Judgment (R. 149-151) and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Modify 
Judgment, Statement of Facts (R. 101-102). 
For this first issue, the Court will need to apply the standard of correctness, giving 
no deference to the trial court's selection, interpretation, and/or application of Utah law in 
relation to counsel's claims in legal memorandum of what his client would testify to at an 
evidentiary hearing that was not held. See MacKav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 
1998). The Court may also apply the standard of plain error in regards to the trial court 
treating the Appellant's legal memoranda as evidence and not hearsay and, thereby, 
affecting a substantial right of the Appellant. See Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 
461,467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). 
Related to and part of this first issue is whether the proffered testimony was 
sufficient to necessitate an evidentiary hearing to determine the truthfulness of it. See 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (R.151). This would also be 
reviewed under the same correctness standard. 
The second main issue is whether the material findings in the trial court's Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Modify Judgment (R. 149-152)) are clearly erroneous after marshaling all the evidence 
that supports the Order, and examining whether such evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. 
For this second issue, the Court would review the issue under the clearly erroneous 
standard after all the evidence supporting the findings is marshaled and viewed in a light 
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most favorable to the trial court's material findings in this matter. See MacKav v. Hardv. 
973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998). 
The third main issue is (1) whether the trial court improperly exercised its power 
of discretion and was arbitrary in its rejection of a plea agreement between the State and 
the Appellant and (2) whether the trial court was in error in the Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify 
Judgment (R.149-151)). 
For this issue, the Court would apply the correctness standard, as referenced 
above, as it relates to the legal finding of the trial court that "it is the conclusion of the 
Court that even if it were determined somehow that the Court had arbitrarily rejected a 
plea agreement, there was an adequate explanation for the imposition of the consecutive 
sentences." See Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (R.151). 
The Court would also apply the abuse of discretion standard in regards to the 
denial of Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Modify Judgment. See Rasmussen v. 
Sharapata. 895 P. 2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). 
Citation to the Record or Statement of Grounds 
According to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5XB), the Appellant 
must make "a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the 
trial court." Because the issues in this appeal arose subsequent to the plea and 
sentencing, the issues were not persevered through the use of objections at a trial on the 
matter. 
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The grounds for review of the post-sentence issues comes from this Court's 
jurisdiction as stated above, and, for example, its ability to hear legal errors by the trial 
court in its use of fixed principles and rules of law, demonstrating the trial court 
incorrectly selected, interpreted, or applied the law. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). In the instant case, the trial court erred, inter alia, in its use of rules of law 
to reject the Appellant's Motion to Modify Judgment. 
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives 
and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the 
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition 
for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being 
responsible for the abuse of that right." Utah Const., Art. I, § 1. 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law." Utah Const, Art. I, § 7. 
"Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor 
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not 
be treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, Art. I, § 9. 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
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offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
"Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule." Utah Const., Art. I, § 12. 
"(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court 
shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 
days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue 
or alter bail or recognizance. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence, (b) On the same grounds that a 
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defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in 
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's 
arrest may be issued by the court, (c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no 
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which 
shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time 
within which any appeal shall be filed. (cX2) If the defendant is convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the 
court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is 
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. 
The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of 
the plea, (d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or 
prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the 
officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court, (e) The court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time, (f) Upon a 
verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill 
offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-202(lXb), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order." Rule 22(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 61. 
"(a) Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) Objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; 
or (2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within 
which questions were asked. Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record 
admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an 
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal, (b) Record of offer and 
ruling. The court may add any other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It 
may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form, (c) Hearing of jury. In 
jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent 
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making 
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury, (d) Plain error. 
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Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Rule 103 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
'"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." 
Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Statement of Case 
This case is criminal in nature. Initially, the trial court that issued a sentence in 
this matter could have followed the original plea agreement that had the sentences 
running concurrently with a federal sentence that the Defendant/Appellant was already 
serving; however, the trial court rejected this plea. On July 16,2010 the Appellant filed a 
Motion to Modify Judgment with the trial court in regards to an illegal sentence. On 
August 6, 2010, the trial court requested additional information regarding the Appellant's 
assertions in a supporting legal memorandum and stated in the court minutes that a 
hearing would be scheduled once that information was received. On August 10, 2010, 
the Appellant responded with the additional information as the court requested and 
reasonably expected to offer testimony evidence at the hearing, which the court had 
expressly indicated it would then set. On August 19, 2010, the Court filed an order 
denying the Appellant's Motion to Modify without holding a hearing. 
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Statement of Facts 
L On or about July 16, 2010, the Defendant/Appellant, who is incarcerated, 
submitted a Motion to Modify Judgment in the trial court based upon 
memorandum assertions of an illegal sentence. See Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Modify Judgment (R.97-104). 
2. On August 6, 2010, the trial court's minute entry stated, "The Court requests a 
clarification of certain representations made in the Defendant's Memorandum. 
The Defendant suggests that the State agreed, and in fact did recommend 
concurrent sentences for the Defendant, The Court could find no such 
recommendation in either the written plea agreement, or in the actual comments 
made by the prosecutor at sentencing. Counsel for Defendant to indicate where 
and when these recommendations were made by the State's attorney. The matter 
will then be set for hearing." See Court Minutes of 8/6/10 (R.120). 
3. On August 10, 2010, the Defendant/Appellant responded to the court's request by 
indicating where the recommendation was and submitting additional exhibits. 
4. The Defendant/Appellant reasonably expected to offer testimony evidence at the 
hearing, which the trial court had expressly indicated it would then set. 
5. Without the hearing, the trial court filed an order on August 19, 2010 denying the 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Modify Judgment (R.149-152). 
6. The Defendant/Appellant timely submitted this appeal, originally, on September 
20, 2010, which is thirty-two (32) days after the denial; the thirtieth day landed on 
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a Saturday and this was filed on the first business day, Monday, immediately 
following the thirtieth day. 
7. The Defendant/Appellant had asserted in the Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Modify Judgment that he "was very surprised by the sentence, considering his 
counsel, Catherine Lilly, assured him with guarantees that he would be given 
sentences that would run concurrent with the sentences already being served. This 
was also the recommendation and assurance of the prosecutor. The only reason 
the Defendant plead guilty to the charges against him was because of the 
assurance of the prosecution and his counsel" See Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Modify Judgment (R.99). 
8. The Defendant/Appellant was never given the opportunity to submit his additional 
evidence on what the prosecution and defense counsel had agreed. 
9. The evidence would have included testimony evidence from three (3) witnesses 
and the procedural history to demonstrate the details of the plea agreement, which 
had not been reduced to writing effectively or did not reflect clearly in the 
statements to the trial court. 
10. The procedural history or transcript of the September 26, 2006 change of plea 
hearing would have included the trial court's acknowledgment of the concurrent 
sentence agreement when it stated, "And [the convictions] could be sentenced for 
the time to run together or run after the other. The courts are not required to 
follow the recommendations of the lawyers in this case. Are you satisfied with 
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your attorney's representations? MR. CLARK: Absolutely, sir." See Change of 
Plea transcript (R. 134-135). Emphasis added. 
11. The procedural history or transcript of the February 12, 2007 sentencing would 
have included the trial court's explicit statement disregarding the plea agreement 
when Judge Robin Reese stated, "You've had a number of charges that have added 
up and I'm not going to just roll them into one." See Sentencing transcript 
(R.129). 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing as it indicated it would in 
order to hear corroborating testimony about the original plea that was rejected. The court 
would not have been able to properly make the findings it entered without the indicated 
witness testimony. Further, the original plea agreement was arbitrarily rejected, resulting 
in a violation of the Appellant's Due Process and other substantial rights, because 
multiple reasons were not stated by the trial court for doing so. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE MEMORANDUM ASSERTIONS WERE NOT EVIDENCE AND NEEDED 
CORROBORATING TESTIMONY AS ANTICD?ATED BY THE COURT 
According to Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "No error in...the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything...omitted by the court...is ground for...disturbing a judgment or order," 
generally speaking. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error 
or defect in the proceeding "which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
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Id. However, there is an exception. Affecting substantial rights is the exception—the 
general rule applies "unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice." Id. See generally Rule 103(a) of the Utah R. Ev., "Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which...excludes evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party is affected." 
In this case, because the Defendant/Appellant is incarcerated and will remain so if 
no correction is made, the substantial rights affected are liberty from an undue length of 
incarceration, freedom from cruel and unusual punishments, and the rights to Due 
Process of law. See Utah Const Art, I, §§ 1, 7, 9, 12. There was error in the trial court's 
recent order omitting the introduction of material facts and evidence about the 
underlying, illegal sentence. See Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
allowing the trial court to "correct'' an illegal sentence, which the court can do "at any 
time." 
The Defendant/Appellant asserted through his attorney in legal memorandum that 
his initial attorney and prosecutor communicated a certain plea agreement to him. The 
trial court requested additional information on the details of this plea and promised it 
would set a hearing after such submission. The Defendant/Appellant relied on this 
assurance, did what was requested by submitting the information, and planned to 
introduce the testimonies of his attorney, the prosecutor, and himself, along with 
procedural history evidence in order to corroborate the memoranda's hearsay affimiations 
of his current counsel. 
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Without setting the hearing as expressly indicated, and, thereby, 
excluding/omitting the testimony evidence, the trial court issued an order denying the 
Defendant/Appellant's motion. As a result, the Appellant/Defendant could not have any 
of his factual testimony evidence admitted as procedural Due Process would have 
permitted. This denial violated multiple substantial rights (see Utah Constitution Article 
I, §§ 1 [takes away his inalienable right to defend his "liberties; to...protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances"], 7 [deprives him of "due process of 
law"], 9 [causes the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments"], 12 [prevents him 
from being able to "defend in person and by counsel,...to testify in his own 
behalf... [and] to appeal in all cases"]). Accordingly, the trial court's order of denial must 
be "corrected" (see Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) or "disturbed." 
See Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This kind of rejection of facts even 
makes him a federal habeas applicant, where, according to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant 
under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute 
were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is 
not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure 
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair 
hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; 
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court 
hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not 
afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293, 313, 83 S. Ct 745 (1963). Emphasis 
added. 
Also, as a result of the exclusion-of-material-facts error and the inadequacies in 
affording him a full fact hearing on this matter, the Defendant/Appellant's personal 
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liberty cannot be restored as it should be—the expected testimony evidence was entirely 
excluded and will never be submitted to the court about concurrent sentencing 
agreements, leaving him incarcerated for a longer duration than is appropriate. 
Accordingly, the trial court's denial without the promised hearing that was only 
conditional upon his submission of additional information, which was met, materially 
violated Mr, Clark's procedural Due Process rights. It also will have violated his 
substantive Due Process rights to personal liberty when he is ultimately found to be 
accurate in his assertions. 
The Appellant claims a materially different plea agreement than is acknowledged 
currently by the trial court, which is not easily seen in the oral record or written record of 
the court, but which evidence exists, and which can be made clearer by the three (3) 
anticipated testimonies and the procedural history. The procedural history or transcript of 
the September 26, 2006 change of plea hearing shows the trial court's original 
acknowledgment of the concurrent sentence agreement when it stated, "And [the 
convictions] could be sentenced for the time to run together or run after the other. The 
courts are not required to follow the recommendations of the lawyers in this case. Are 
you satisfied with your attorney's representations? MR. CLARK: Absolutely, sir." See 
Change of Plea transcript (R.134-135). Emphasis added. Based only on the written 
record, it appears that "in this case" the lawyers had recommended the sentences to "run 
together" and Mr, Clark was very satisfied with that. Id. The procedural history or 
transcript of the February 12, 2007 sentencing again acknowledges the trial court's 
acknowledgment of the agreement for concurrent sentences and its explicit statement 
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disregarding the plea agreement when Judge Robin Reese stated, "You've had a number 
of charges that have added up and I'm not going to just roll them into one." See 
Sentencing transcript (R.129). 
The trial court's order omitting the testimony evidence from witnesses to 
coiroborate the written evidence in the transcripts and relying merely on the hearsay 
evidence1 of the memoranda is, therefore, error as an improper application of law, which 
must be reviewed for correctness and the order reversed. The order is also based, 
presumably, on an insufficiency of the evidence, which must also be reviewed from the 
clearly erroneous standard and then reversed. 
II. 
IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IS FOUND TO SUPPORT THE CLAIMS, THEN 
THIS COURT MUST DECIDE IF THE PLEA WAS REJECTED IMPROPERLY 
If this Court determines, absent the anticipated witness testimonies and 
explanation of the procedural history, that the Defendant/Appellant has established that 
the trial court, in fact, rejected certain agreements of an underlying plea agreement, then 
this Court must determine (1) whether the trial court failed to follow the legal 
requirements in articulating multiple reasons why the plea agreement should not be 
followed at sentencing and (2) whether the sentence was illegal as a result of an arbitrary 
decision not to follow the plea agreement based on the reason(s) stated, or lack thereof. 
1
 See Rules 801(c) and 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: '"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules."; see also the persuasive authority in cases 
of summary judgment, which are applicable to the summary disposition of the trial court in this matter, u[T]he 
submission of a hearsay affirmation by counsel alone does not satisfy this requirement... [for] admissible evidence." 
Zndrermmiv City of NY. 49 N.Y. 2d 557, 560,427 NYS 2d 595 (N.Y. Ct App. 1980)). 
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Specifically at issue in this case is that the trial court failed to state any proper 
reasons why it rejected the plea that the Defendant/Appellant understood he had agreed 
to, which was that his sentences would run concurrently with what he was already 
serving. In the Utah Code § 76-3-401(2), there are multiple reasons to consider: "In 
determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court 
shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." There are multiple 
reasons that the trial court must state for imposing consecutive sentences. 
Here, the plea agreement was for concurrent sentences. This plea was rejected. 
The sentencing transcript of the February 12, 2007 records the trial court's explicit 
statement disregarding the plea agreement when Judge Robin Reese stated, "You've had 
a number of charges that have added up and Vm not going to just roll them into one." 
See Sentencing transcript (R.129). Emphasis added. If this statement is considered a 
reason for rejection, which the Appellant does not concede that it does, then this single 
reason about the "number" of charges, rather than their gravity, certainly does not qualify 
as one that considers "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" (Utah Code 
§ 76-3-401(2)), as required by the Utah Code. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court's holding, a trial court must "state its 
reasons for rejecting the plea on the record so as to demonstrate that the court did not 
reject the plea arbitrarily." State of Utah v. Montiel 2005 UT 48, f 31,122 P.3d 571,581 
(Utah 2005). Arbitrariness and the determination of whether more than one reason was 
18 
stated are legal conclusions after reviewing all of the trial court's dicta. This 
determination, therefore, would be made by the correctness standard. In this case, the 
trial court was arbitrary when it failed to state multiple reasons that are legally significant 
as to why it was rejecting the plea agreement for concurrent sentences. 
Additionally, this Court would apply the abuse of discretion standard. "A failure 
to exercise discretion is generally encompassed within the meaning of abuse of 
discretion." State v. Loveless, 2010 UT 24, [^8, 232 P.3d 510, 512 (Utah 2010). This 
Court would determine whether the trial court abused the exercise of its discretion in (1) 
rejecting the plea and failing to articulate multiple reasons for rejecting the plea 
agreement as understood by the attorneys and the Defendant/Appellant at the time of the 
change of plea hearing and/or (2) whether the trial court's stated reason(s), if any, are 
arbitrary. 
The trial court refused an evidentiary hearing on a matter where the 
Defendant/Appellant argued in legal memoranda that the plea agreement was not 
followed as he reasonably understood it. In our own federal courts, "It is well settled that 
we must interpret the agreement according to the defendant's reasonable understanding 
of [the plea agreement's] terms." U.S. v. Cachucha, 484 R 3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 
2007). Similarly, if the evidence is insufficient to establish the exact terms of the plea 
agreement, which evidence the Appellant argues is, in fact, insufficient, then this Court 
should require the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
Defendant/Appellant's reasonable understanding of the plea agreement terms he entered 
into and then accept or reject the plea without arbitrariness. Otherwise, this Court should 
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correct the illegal sentence by reversing the arbitrary rejection of the plea agreement and 
reinstating the terms of concurrent sentences with the sentence the Defendant/Appellant 
was already serving. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61; accord State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (error that does affect substantial rights of the parties is reversible error, 
not harmless error). 
CONCLUSION and RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court has not acted by the standards of evidence as indicated in Rule 
801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence when considering the Appellant's claims. The trial 
court must maintain the integrity of due process, and, accordingly, the court should have 
kept its promise to hold a hearing on the motion of the Appellant. Failing to do so not 
only casts doubt on judicial prudence, but also on the equality and fairness of the trial 
court. The court's decision to not hold an evidentiary hearing made accurate findings on 
the claims impossible. The Court treated the Defendant's memorandum as evidence 
instead of an indication of evidence and has, thereby, caused harmful error. This Court 
should determine the incorrectness, clearly erroneous nature, and the abuse of discretion 
of the recent final order of the trial court denying the Defendant/Appellant's Motion for 
Modification of Judgment. The Court should order the trial court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing if this Court determines the trial court should have done so on the Motion to 
Modify Judgment for the alleged illegal sentence. 
Dated this 2nd day of May 2011. 
U 1-
Taylor C. Hartley 
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copy of the foregoing document to the following this 2w day of Apflf2011. 
Criminal Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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